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How do banks react to increased competition?  Recent banking theory offers conflicting 
predictions about the impact of competition on bank orientation íLHWKHFKoice of relationship 
based versus transactional banking.  We empirically investigate the impact of interbank 
competition on bank branch orientation.  We employ a unique data set containing detailed 
information on bank-firm relationships.  We find that bank branches facing stiff local competition 
engage considerably more in relationship-based lending.  Our results illustrate that competition and 
relationships are not necessarily inimical. 
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 I.  Introduction 
In their seminal paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
investigate the effects of competition between banks on the loan rate and the availability of bank 
credit to firms.  Petersen and Rajan model how especially lower quality firms are negatively 
affected by competition between banks, as banks may be unwilling to invest in relationships by 
incurring initial loan losses when firms can later on obtain low loan rates in a competitive banking 
market.  Petersen and Rajan document that young firms in more concentrated banking markets 
obtain more relationship benefits, i.e., lower loan rates and easier access to bank credit, than firms 
in more competitive banking markets. 
However, recent work is starting to question whether credit market competition is always 
inimical to the formation of mutually beneficial relationships between firms and banks.  Boot and 
Thakor (2000), for example, revisit the presumed incompatibility between competition and 
relationship finance and argue that the source of competition matters in the determination of bank 
orientation (i.e., relationship-based versus transactional lending).  In their model, interbank 
competition actually increases the relative amount of relationship lending whereas capital market 
competition reduces relationship-lending chosen by banks.  Their reasoning is that banks when 
faced with stiffer interbank competition have greater incentives to offer relationship loans.  
Relationship lending (compared to transactional lending) allows banks to shield rents more 
effectively, as relationship banking differentiates the lending bank better from competing banks. 
A recent paper by Elsas (2005), published in this Journal, is the first to empirically study the 
determinants of relationship lending.  Elsas employs a cross-sectional data set containing bank 
credit files on 122 large German firms to investigate the relationship between local bank market 
concentration and the likelihood a bank assesses itself to be the “Hausbank” of a firm.  He 
documents a mostly decreasing relationship between concentration and the incidence of the 
Hausbank status. 
However, his study suffers from serious shortcomings we aim to address in our empirical 
analysis.  Indeed, his Hausbank measure is tenuous and subjective, affected by framing directly 
related to bank market concentration.  First, Elsas analyzes a small sample of 122 German firms 
that are quite large: the median firm in his sample is around 500 times larger in sales than the 
median U.S. firm in the widely employed 1993 NSSBF sample for example.  Large firms may have 
their seats in cities where many different banks have located their branches.  However large firms 
may seek funds nationwide from a handful of large banks or obtain funding locally where their 
production plants are based.  His empirical bank market concentration however employs the 




firms borrowing regionally or nationally, bank market concentration measured in the local debt 
market at the registered seat of the firm may not be all that relevant.  Second, banks may be quicker 
to claim to be the Hausbank of these larger and more prestigious firms (an interpretation not 
incompatible with some of the size results in Elsas).  On this account his Hausbank – market 
concentration findings could be spurious. 
For firms borrowing locally, a 30% share of total debt financing for example may lead a bank to 
assess itself to be a Hausbank in a market with 20 equally sized banks but not in an equally shared 
duopoly.  If banks know other banks’ market shares but not individual borrower shares, the case in 
Elsas (2005), a 30% share seems large in the 20-bank case, but is known for sure to be the smallest 
share in the duopoly.
1  As a result the hurdle above which a bank may be reporting Hausbank status 
increases in concentration and also on this account his Hausbank – market concentration findings 
could be spurious. 
Despite these serious shortcomings, the empirical approach taken by Elsas (2005) has two 
fundamental merits.  First, any comprehensive measure of the lending arrangement is better suited 
for a cross-sectional exploration of the determinants of relationship banking and such a measure 
can capture relationship formation far better than any individual loan rate or proxy of credit 
availability (because of bank fees and cross-selling for example).
2  Second, his study of the lending 
arrangement per se can be further motivated by the salient observation that in “relationship 
models” the ultimate effects on loan rates and welfare of changes in competition can be ambiguous, 
but the effects on bank orientation typically are not (as in Boot and Thakor (2000)). 
Our paper follows the astute empirical approach taken by Elsas (2005), but addresses its original 
shortcomings.  Rather than relying on a single subjective measure of the lending arrangement, we 
employ multiple objective measures.  We also analyze a much larger data set containing loans to 
13,098 small firms, mainly single-person businesses, for which the informational asymmetry 
building blocks of theory are more relevant.  This data set allows us for the first time to study how 
local and national competition affects the lending orientation at the local level (which we will 
argue later is actually the relevant level to study in this case). 
We find, in line with Boot and Thakor (2000), that when local interbank competition is fiercer a 
borrower is more likely to be engaged in relationship banking.  In particular the presence in the 
                                                       
 
1 Even if all banks would know borrower shares and even if there is only one other lender covering the 
remaining 70%, the 30%-bank may be more likely to designate itself a (second) Hausbank in the 20-bank 
market than in the duopoly. 
2 In this regard Elsas’ study complements Petersen and Rajan (1995) who employ cross-sectional data to infer 
loan rate smoothing and increased availability of credit over the lifetime of their sample firms (Black and 




postal zone of the borrower of many other banks with equal market shares or the presence of banks 
with multiple contacts across other postal zones results in substantially more relationship lending.  
These findings hold for different subsamples and proxies for relationship banking and are 
seemingly not spurious. 
We further document that borrowers located closer to the bank branch are more likely to be 
engaged as relationship borrowers.  Finally, we report that larger bank branches lend substantially 
more on a transactional basis, a result suggestive of organizational size effects modeled by Stein 
(2002). 
We organize the rest of the paper as follows.  Section II reviews the theoretical predictions and 
recent empirical findings regarding interbank competition and bank orientation.  Section III 
introduces the data and discusses the variables used in our empirical analysis.  Section IV displays 
and discuss the empirical results.  Section V concludes. 
II. Theoretical Predictions and Recent Empirical Findings 
A.  Interbank Competition and Bank Orientation 
Theory offers conflicting views on the relation between interbank competition and a bank’s 
willingness to engage in relationship lending (Figure 1 summarizes the predictions of the different 
theoretical models).  A first set of theories argues that competition and relationships are 
incompatible.  Mayer (1988) is the first to apply this insight to banking competition and 
relationship formation.  Mayer hypothesizes that long-term relationships, allowing firms to 
intertemporally share risks with their banks, only arise if banks enjoy the possibility to extract 
profits over time, i.e. when the flexibility of the borrowing firms to switch banks is limited.  
Vigorous competition in the banking market undermines a firm’s ability to commit towards future 
compensation of a bank’s initial investments. 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) model the impact of bank market power on the possibilities to 
intertemporally share risks.  Market power is exogenous in their framework and a monopolistic 
bank extracts the high future surplus generated by the firm by backloading interest payments.  A 
bank in a competitive (future) market does not have the same latitude to share surplus 
intertemporally and consequently the bank may be less willing to initiate a relationship and offer 




unwilling to incur losses that can never be recouped.  Hence, credit will be more widely available 
in banking markets where banks enjoy market power.
3 
 Boot and Thakor (2000) extensively revisit the presumed incompatibility between competition 
and the nature of relationship financing.  They argue that more interbank competition leads to more 
relationship lending.  Boot and Thakor distinguish between two sources of competition, i.e., capital 
market competition and interbank competition, and they allow banks to choose between 
relationship lending and transactional lending.  In their model stiffer capital market competition 
reduces relationship lending, while interbank competition actually increases the relative amount of 
relationship lending.  A bank offering a relationship loan augments a borrower’s success 
probability.  Relationship lending then allows extracting higher rents from the borrower.  Fiercer 
interbank competition pushes banks into offering more relationship lending, as this activity permits 
banks to shield their rents better.  In their model interbank competition further reduces bank 
industry specialization in relationship loans as on the margin the returns to industry specialization 
decline.  Hence, the value added of the relationship loan for the borrower also decreases.
4 
Finally, relationship lending is non-monotonically related to the degree of concentration in 
banking markets in Dinç (2000), Yafeh and Yosha (2001) and Anand and Galetovic (2006), while 
Elsas, Heinemann and Tyrell (2004) and Minetti (2005) model firms engaging both transactional 
and relationship banks. 
To conclude, how interbank competition affects bank orientation seems ultimately an empirical 
question. 
                                                       
 
3 Market power is exogenous in Petersen and Rajan (1995) and the crucial information asymmetry is between 
borrowing firms and banks.  Firms initially know their own quality, but banks do not.  Banks learn the 
borrowers’ type over time.  In contrast Fischer (1990), Rajan (1992), Sharpe (1990), and von Thadden (2004) 
highlight the information asymmetry between banks.  By lending repeatedly “inside” banks gather proprietary 
repayment information, an informational advantage vis-à-vis “outside” competing banks, and some degree of 
monopoly power over the borrowing firms.  Bank relationships arise endogenously in these models, even in 
perfectly competitive banking markets, and the “learning by lending” does not require relationship specific 
investments as in Anand and Galetovic (2006) for example.  In Dell' Ariccia (2001) banks combine market 
power from product differentiation (exogenous) with informational monopoly power (endogenous).  The 
contours of the informational asymmetry per se determine both the choice of banking type and the resulting 
market structure.  Abatement in the informational problem in his model may lead to more banks operating in 
the market and more transactional banking, resulting in a similar correspondence (though not causality) 
between market structure and banking choice as in Petersen and Rajan (1995).  More product differentiation 
on the other hand leads, for a given number of banks, to more price discrimination in the second period and 
higher loan rates in the first period. 
4 Fiercer interbank competition also results in more relationship lending in Banerjee (2002), Dell' Ariccia and 
Marquez (2004), Freixas (2005), Gehrig (1998), Hauswald and Marquez (2006), and Schmeits (2004).  




B.  Empirical Findings on Interbank Competition and Bank Orientation 
Most empirical work so far has investigated the effects of interbank competition on indirect 
measures of bank orientation (Figure 1 also summarizes the main empirical findings).  In their 
seminal paper Petersen and Rajan (1995) investigate the effect of local interbank competition on 
the loan rate and the availability of bank credit for credit-constrained (e.g., young or distressed) 
firms in the 1988 U.S. National Survey of Small Business Finance dataset.  They employ a 
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI) in the local market for deposits to measure concentration.  
Petersen and Rajan find that young firms in more concentrated markets (HHI > 0.18) obtain lower 
loan rates and take more early (trade credit) payment discounts (i.e., have easier access to bank 
credit) than firms in more competitive banking markets.  Banks seemingly smooth loan rates in 
concentrated markets and as a result provide more financing, in line with the predictions of their 
theoretical model.
5 
Black and Strahan (2002) revisit the local competition – bank orientation issue exploring an 
alternative measure of local credit availability.  In particular, they investigate the rate of new 
business incorporations across U.S. states.  They find that deregulation of bank branching 
restrictions positively affects new incorporations and, more importantly, that in contrast to Petersen 
and Rajan (1995) deregulation reduces the negative effect of banking market concentration on new 
incorporations.  They also find that the widespread presence of small banks decreases business 
formation.
6 
Recent papers by Fischer (2000) and Elsas (2005) investigate the local competition – bank 
orientation correspondence using German data.  Fischer (2000) focuses on the transfer of 
information and the availability of credit and finds that both are higher in more concentrated 
markets.  Elsas (2005) studies the determinants of relationship lending.  He documents a non-
monotonic relationship between local bank market concentration and the probability a bank is 
designated as “Hausbank”.  In particular, he finds that the incidence of Hausbank status is actually 
the lowest for an intermediate range of market concentration with an HHI of around 0.2, though he 
notes that most observations of the HHI are also in that low range.  Nevertheless his findings 
broadly suggest the presence of more relationship banking in more competitive markets. 
                                                       
 
5 Recent work by Zarutskie (2005) and Scott and Dunkelberg (2001) analyzing other U.S. datasets broadly 
confirm these findings.  On the other hand preliminary work by Montoriol Garriga (2005) and Ogura (2005) 
using the NSSBF dataset show competition and relationship banking are not necessarily incompatible. 
6 Cetorelli (2001), Cetorelli (2003), and Cetorelli and Strahan (2005) also find that banking market power may 
represent a financial barrier to entry in product markets.  However Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) 




To conclude, many empirical papers have investigated the effects of interbank competition on 
indirect measures of bank orientation.  However none of the aforementioned papers employs direct 
measures of bank orientation (with the exception of Elsas (2005)) and controls for both local and 
nation-wide competition jointly. 
III.  Data and Variables 
A.  Data 
The unique data set we analyze consists of loans granted to 13,098 firms by an important 
Belgian bank that operates all over Belgium.  The sample includes all existing loans at the bank as 
of August 10, 1997 that were initiated after January 1, 1995.  Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) 
and Degryse and Ongena (2005) employ the same data set.  For each borrower we take the 
characteristics at the time of the first contract observed in the bank’s loan portfolio. 
Critical elements of both the Belgian financial landscape and the bank itself make this data 
ideally suited to investigate the effect of local and nation-wide interbank competition on bank 
orientation.  Previous studies show that the highly developed Belgian banking market is very 
representative for many other banking markets around the world in terms of concentration and 
competition.
7  In addition to a representative banking sector, the Belgian financial system was 
characterized by a high degree of capital market stability before and during the sample period and 
most firms we study did not have access during the sample period; hence we can safely abstract 
from changes in capital market competition in our empirical work. 
The bank we study is one of a handful of truly national and general-purpose banks operating in 
Belgium in 1997.  As such the bank lends to firms located in most postal zones and is active in 50 
different industries (according to a two-digit NACE classification).  Around 83% of the firms in its 
portfolio are single-person businesses and most borrowers obtain just one, relatively small, loan 
from this bank.  Small Belgian firms typically do not tap into the equity or bond markets for their 
external financing, and typically apply for loans at local bank branches. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 13,098 fully identifiable borrowers, showing the 
definition, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of our variables, broken down into 
seven sets of characteristics: (1) dependent variables measuring bank orientation, (2) competition 
                                                       
 
7 For example, Barth, Caprio and Nolle (2004) report that the three largest banks in the market account for 
57% of all bank assets, while foreign banks hold 24%.  The average percentages in their sample covering 55 
countries are 50% and 36% respectively, ranking (from high to low) the Belgian banking sector in 21
st and 
23
rd position.  Claessens and Laeven (2004) report that the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic for Belgium 
equals 0.73 for the years 1994-2001 (H<0 indicates a monopoly, while H=1 indicates perfect competition), 




measures, (3) distance variables, (4) the bank branch characteristic, (5) postal zone variables, (6) 
firm size and legal form dummies, and (7) other firm characteristics.  We turn to each of these sets 
of variables in the next subsections. 
B.  Level of Analysis: Local and Branch 
We a priori choose to analyze the competition - orientation correspondence at the local level.  
Most sample firms are small, implying that loan applications by firms and loan decisions by banks 
are taken locally both at the data-granting bank as well as at rival banks.  Formalized interviews we 
conducted within the data-granting bank indeed indicated that loan officers located in the bank’s 
branches enjoyed considerable autonomy granting and pricing small business loans.  Upon deciding 
loan conditions officers merely file a mostly qualitative summary report with the headquarters in 
Brussels (calculated credit scores were surprisingly only used as inputs to determine bank level re-
insurance).  Crucial for our purposes, the officers’ own assessment of the development of the 
relationship with the firm played a key role in motivating past lending decisions. 
Accordant to this apparent de jure local autonomy in lending orientation, in Degryse and 
Ongena (2005) we document substantial variation in loan rates across bank branches and patterns 
of spatial price discrimination at the branch level.  Such pricing behavior strongly substantiates also 
de facto local autonomy and even branch profit maximization.  Ultimately though, the 
interpretation of our competition – orientation specifications never truly hinges upon branch 
autonomy: even if “Brussels” would optimally determine lending orientation vis-à-vis each 
individual borrower taking into account the intensity of local competition and distance (which we 
find rather unlikely given the inside information we have about the bank), our results would still 
remain interpretable as such.  The only place where the empirical analysis would veer somewhat 
off the theoretical track is when we investigate branch industry specialization (further down in the 
paper). 
Consequently given the characteristics of our sample firms, our inside information and the 
results of our earlier empirical work it seems reasonable and actually essential to test the relevant 
theoretical predictions at the local and branch level, though the theoretical modeling mostly relates 
to decision units that are labeled ‘banks’. 
C.  Dependent Variables Measuring Orientation 
We employ as our main dependent variable measuring bank orientation a dummy Relationship 
Banking we define to equal one if the length of the relationship with the borrower exceeds one year 
and if the bank considers itself as the Main Bank, and to equal zero otherwise.  Hence our main 




borrower.  Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000a) argue that both duration and scope 
characterize relationship banking.
8  In addition we note that Petersen and Rajan (1995) focus on 
intertemporal pricing in a relationship, while in Boot and Thakor (2000) the scope of an existing 
relationship may enhance project success. 
A firm - bank relationship starts when a firm buys for the first time a product from that bank.  
The average duration of the relationship in the sample is around eight years.  Duration proxies for 
the increased time for a firm to experience the banks’ products and to appreciate the added 
flexibility the bank has to maintain and fulfill implicit contracts.  While the bank gains private 
information about a firm to tailor its products, the firm may also become locked-in (for example, 
Boot and Thakor (1994), Sharpe (1990), and Rajan (1992)). 
We find justification for using a duration cut-off of only one year in Angelini, Di Salvo and 
Ferri (1998) and Cole (1998), who document that credit availability does not increase much beyond 
the first years of a relationship (we replace one year by three years in robustness exercises).  We 
also note that the repayment duration of more than 60% of the observed loans is shorter than or 
equal to one year.  Hence it seems likely that for the majority of the borrowers rollovers of loans 
take place within the first year of the relationship. 
The variable Main Bank captures the scope of the relationship and indicates whether this bank 
considers itself as the main-bank of the firm or not.  The definition used by the bank to determine 
whether it is the main-bank is the firm is “having a monthly ‘turnover’ on the current account of at 
least BEF 100,000 (¼
9 and is buying at least two products from the bank.”  Only 54% of all 
borrowers are classified as Main Bank customers.  Banks may obtain an important informational 
advantage from observing turnover on checking accounts (Nakamura (1993), Vale (1993), Mester, 
Nakamura and Renault (2005)).  But as de Bodt, Lobez and Statnik (2005) document that small 
Belgian firms employ on average two banks, our Main Bank variable captures variation beyond the 
mere mechanical outcome of the firms’ preference for a single checking account and relationship.  
On the other hand we recognize that the competition – orientation models we highlight disregard 
the option of multiple bank relationships.  However we conjecture that the main hypotheses in 
these models may unfold qualitatively unaffected if this additional choice is introduced, a topic we 
leave for future theoretical research. 
                                                       
 
8 The intensity of the relationship, reflected in for example the frequency of loan rollovers, could be a 
relationship dimension usefully separable from scope (Bodenhorn (2003)).  Trust or quality, build on personal 
contacts between the loan officer and the entrepreneur, could also be relevant (Harhoff and Körting (1998); 
Lehmann and Neuberger (2001)). 
9 We use Belgian Francs (BEF) throughout the paper but indicate equivalent amounts in Euros.  Belgium 
switched to the Euro on January 1




We frame the dependent variable as a dummy variable because theory suggests a dichotomy 
between relationship and transactional lending.  However we will employ the duration of the 
relationship and Main Bank separately as dependent variables in robustness exercises. 
Additional advantages of our dummy approach are that: (1) given our definition about half the 
firms are engaged as relationship borrowers (i.e., the mean of our independent variable is close to 
50%); (2) the reported partial derivatives allow for a straightforward percentage interpretation; and 
(3) comparison with results in other papers, in particular Elsas (2005), is possible. 
D.  Herfindahl – Hirschman Index of Market Concentration 
As of December 31
st, 1994, we identify 7,477 branches operated by 145 different banks and 
located in 837 different postal zones.  Each postal zone carries a postal code between 1,000 and 
9,999 (the first digit in the code indicates a geographical region, which we call “postal area” and 
which in most cases coincides with one of the ten Provinces in Belgium).  A postal zone covers on 
average 26 sq km and contains approximately six bank branches.  A postal area covers 3,359 sq km 
on average.  Not surprisingly borrowers are often located in more densely banked areas, with on 
average more than 17 bank branches per postal zone. 
Previous research has argued that the relevant loan market is local in nature for small 
businesses.  Branch proximity continues to play an important role in determining bank choice by 
borrowers in both the US (Hannan (1991)) and Europe (Sapienza (2002)).  Results reported in 
Degryse and Ongena (2005) show that loan rates in Belgium are not uniform across borrowers or 
across branches.  In addition, physical distance between borrower and local financier affects loan 
conditions. 
The median borrower in our sample is located less than 2.5 kilometers from the lending bank 
branch.  This distance seemingly hasn’t increased by much since the mid-seventies (Degryse and 
Ongena (2005)).  As the number of bank branches decreased by only around 4% during the last two 
decades and few nationwide entries or M&As took place, local branch configurations most likely 
hardly changed as banking consolidation through a number of major within-market mergers took 
place only at the end of the nineties.  We therefore a priori select each postal zone as the relevant 
market.
10 
Our main measure of competition is the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI).  This variable is 
widely used as a measure of concentration in the literature; Petersen and Rajan (1995) for example 




(2000) the number of banks and hence by extension the HHI delineates the degree of competition in 
their model.  We define HHI as the summed squares of bank market shares by the number of 
branches in each postal zone.  U.S. bank concentration studies always use deposit market shares.  
However, Elsas (2005) also employs branch market shares for Germany while Fischer (2001) 
shows that for U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas the “branch HHI” is highly correlated with the 
“deposit HHI”.
11 
We also employ the total Number of Branches and the Number of Banks in each postal zone as 
competition measures.  The former measure assumes no coordination can occur between the 
branches of the same bank, while the latter measure presupposes coordination effectively takes 
place.  We invert both variables to account for the decreasing effects of additional bank branches 
and banks.  Inversion also facilitates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients and 
comparisons across the competition variables, in particular with the HHI measure.  Both 
transformed Number measures are bound between zero and one, with zero indicating no market 
concentration and one indicating maximum concentration.
12 
E.  Multi-Market Contact 
The postal zone is our a priori chosen banking market.  However, many banks are operating in 
more than one postal zone and often compete with other multi-location banks across zones (Barros 
(1999) or Park and Pennacchi (2004)).  Edwards (1955) introduced the “linked oligopoly” 
hypothesis that predicts cross-market contacts among banks to increase the incentives for banks to 
collude.  The hypothesis implies that banks compete less when geographical market-overlap 
increases.  Multi-market contact facilitates anti-competitive “mutual forbearance”, as the 
punishment for deviation from collusion becomes large (Heggestad and Roades (1978), Bernheim 
and Whinston (1990)), and coordination between banks then fosters relationship banking as in 
Anand and Galetovic (2006). 
However, other theoretical work points towards a possible pro-competitive effect of multi-
market contact (Scott (1982)).  Mester (1987), for example, presents a Cournot competition model 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
10 An incorrect a priori choice of the relevant geographical market cuts against finding significant results for 
the simple reason that with inappropriate market delineation we expect the resulting “markets” not to be 
relevant in determining competitive conditions. 
11 For postal zones without bank branches we set the HHI equal to one to facilitate decomposing the 
concentration index later in the paper (by corollary the Number of Banks, another competition variable 
introduced shortly, is also set equal to one).  However, as a robustness check, we remove branchless postal 
zones in part of the exercises. 
12 As some borrowers reside in postal zones without bank branches (i.e., the lending bank branch is located in 
another, possibly adjacent, postal zone), we add one to the Number of Branches before inverting (remember 




in which banks have incomplete information about their rivals’ marginal costs.  As a result banks 
claim to have low marginal costs to sway competitors to produce less.  If costs are imperfectly 
correlated across markets, multi-market banks have an incentive to put larger quantities on the 
market than the profit-maximizing level.  “In markets with high concentration, control is in the 
hands of a few banks. Thus incentives for these [banks] to mislead other [banks] are greater since 
they stand to gain more” (p. 540).  Similarly, but in a different setting, Park and Pennacchi (2004) 
show that the presence of large multi-market banks promotes local competition, in particular in 
highly concentrated markets. 
We construct a state-of-the-art Multi-Market Contact measure as proposed in Evans and 
Kessides (1994).
13  The variable can be defined succinctly as the sum of all bank pairs in the 
borrower’s postal zone weighted by the relative frequency of their bilateral contacts in other postal 
zones.  The variable is bounded between zero (banks in the postal zone have no contact elsewhere) 
and one (all banks in the zone have contact with all other banks across all other postal zones). 
F.  Distance Variables 
Location may determine the degree of competition for a borrower when either borrower 
(Hotelling (1929); Salop (1979)) or lender (Sussman and Zeira (1995)) face transportation costs.  In 
standard spatial models, borrowers select the closest bank and the location of the median borrower 
determines the intensity of competition.  However, there is no distinction in these models between 
“relationship” and “transactional” banking, as borrowers seek only one bank product in a single 
period. 
In multi-product spatial models, firms in need of multiple products may engage a single bank, 
most likely the closest one, in order to minimize transportation and search costs (Armstrong and 
Vickers (2001)).  Consequently in multi-product spatial models firms close to the lender may be 
more likely to opt for “relationship banking” (in scope). 
Alternatively, in multi-period spatial models in which borrowers can switch lender, “close” 
borrowers may be more likely to stay than the borrowers located farther away from their first-
period lender (Dell' Ariccia (2001)).  Again, close borrowers are destined to be “relationship 
                                                       
 
13 We consolidate the branches in 104 banks (sometimes banks comprise distinctly incorporated sets of 
branches in Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia).  There are 837 postal zones with bank branches.  Let Dij = 1 if 
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borrowers” (now in duration) on the basis of their proximity to the lender.  In addition, this effect 
may actually strengthen (Hauswald and Marquez (2006)) if the number of local banks increases. 
To control for the effects of transportation costs, we calculate the distance between the borrower 
and both the lending bank and the branches of all other, competing banks located in the same postal 
zone as the borrower (Degryse and Ongena (2005) provide details).  Address recording errors, 
incomplete map coverage, changes in street names and borrower relocation cut in our sample.  We 
further conservatively remove the 1-% borrowers located farthest from their lending bank and drop 
borrowers located in postal zones without competing banks.  We end up with Distance to Lender 
and Distance to Closest Competitors measures for 11,222 borrowers (we call this reduced sample 
the “Distance sample”). 
We transform both measures to (1 + Distance to Lender)
-1 and [1 – (1+Distance to Closest 
Competitors)
-1], respectively.  Again, both transformations account at once for the possibly 
decreasing effects of distance and constrain the variables to be between zero (“around the corner 
from the lender”) and one (“really far away from the lender”) enabling easier benchmarking.  For 
example, if both distance measures equal one, the borrower is located close to the observed lender 
but really far from a competing bank.  Conditioning on the fact that we observe the close lender 
granting the loan, we expect, as in a multi-product problem or in a multi-period setting as in 
Dell'Ariccia (2001), that the engagement is more likely to be relationship-based.  On the other 
hand, if both distance measures equal zero, the borrower is located far from the observed lender but 
really close to a competing bank.  Conditioning on the fact that we observe a far-away lender 
granting the loan, we can expect the engagement to be transactional. 
G.  Control Variables 
We introduce bank branch size, postal zone variables, and firm size, legal form and industry 
dummies in the base regressions.  We include additional firm characteristics in robustness 
exercises. 
Start with the variable Branch Size.  Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) argue that 
organizational diseconomies of engaging in different type of lending activities may prevent large 
banks from efficiently providing both transaction-based lending to large corporations and 
relationship-based lending to small businesses.  Large hierarchical banks in Stein (2002) only 
succeed when information is “hard” enough to flow freely inside the bank.  On the other hand, only 
loan officers at small banks may have the proper incentives to collect and take advantage of “soft” 
information (that cannot “travel” so easily up the chain of command), precisely the type of 
information that could be needed to advance relationship banking (see also Berger, Miller, 




We conjecture that Stein’s arguments are also relevant when assessing the lending activities of 
autonomous bank branches.  Large branches may have one or two hierarchical layers.  As a result, 
loan officers employed in large branches then are less willing to engage in the collection of soft 
information and relationship lending suffers.  We include Branch Size to control for the size 
differences across the branches.  In effect, we pursue a more stringent test of some of the “size” 
implications of Stein’s model as all branches belong to the same bank.  We measure Branch Size by 
the proportion of the bank’s business loan portfolio at each branch (we take the number of loans at 
a branch over the total number of loans).  There are substantial differences in Branch Size across 
the bank.  The mean bank branch accounts for 44 loans (0.25%) while the largest branch reports 
161 of all 17,776 loans (0.91%).  The smallest branch has only one business loan. 
To control for regional variation in corporate demand for banking services, we introduce a set of 
postal zone variables that also includes eight Postal Area Dummies.  The variable Number of Firms 
measures the number of registered firms in the borrower’s postal zone, while the variable Assets of 
Firms averages the amount of assets of registered firms in the borrower’s postal zone.  Both 
variables are constructed using Belfirst, a database containing end-of-1994 information on 176,382 
Belgian firms.  We similarly construct Industry Concentration to measure the proportion of 
registered firms in the borrower’s postal zone in the industry of the borrower.  Finally, we 
introduce a dummy variable Urban to control for general differences between businesses located in 
rural and urban communities.  Urban may further capture heterogeneity in information available to 
banks.  For example, banks in urban areas may rely more on hard information while rural banks 
may collect more soft information (Klein (1992)).  Urban equals one when the borrower is located 
in an agglomeration with more than 250,000 inhabitants, and zero otherwise. 
To control for other firm characteristics, we include two firm size,
14 four legal form and as many 
as 49 industry dummies (in addition to the base case).  We can distinguish between Single-Person 
Businesses (82.8% of the sample), Small (16.0%), and Medium and Large (1.6%) Firms; and 
between Sole Proprietorships (82.1%), Limited Partnerships (12.1%), Limited Partnerships with 
Equal Sharing (1.0%), Corporations (3.9%), and Temporary Arrangements (0.9%).  In the 
regressions, we exclude the dummies for Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships. 
To control further for firm characteristics we also focus on the 9,213 (70.3%) of the borrowers 
that are both Single-Person Business and Sole Proprietorship (this reduced sample we call the “SPB 
& SP sample”), collect Age for 1,991 firms (the “Age sample”), and glean Assets, Earnings / 
                                                       
 
14 It may be more profitable for banks to reserve relationship lending for loans of larger size (Stanton (2002)) 
and for large firms.  We employ firm size dummies, as the full dataset does not contain any other measures of 




Assets, and Short-Term Debt / Assets from Belfirst for 645 firms (the “Augmented sample”).  We 
will employ each of these samples in robustness exercises.  We display some key sample statistics 
in Table 2. 
IV.  Empirical Results 
In this section we analyze the regressions of the dependent variable(s) measuring bank 
orientation on the set of competition and control variables.  The correlations displayed in Table 3 
between the main dependent and the discussed competition variables already indicate the direction 
of some of our results.  We start discussing the effects of the competition variables and return to a 
discussion of all the control variables at the end of the section.  We first discuss the results for the 
dependent variable Relationship Banking and turn to the alternative measures of bank orientation, 
i.e., Duration and Main bank in robustness checks. 
A.  Postal Zone Competition and Relationship Banking 
1.  Various Measures of Competition 
Since Relationship Banking is a binary dependent variable, we employ a Probit model.
15  In 
Table 4 we report the partial derivatives, in percent, at the means and significance levels based on 
t-ratios for the coefficients.  To conserve space we neither display partial derivatives for most of 
the control variables nor the standard errors in Table 4, but return to these estimates later. 
In Model I we start with the commonly used (and previously detailed) measure of market 
concentration, i.e., the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI).  The coefficient on this measure is 
statistically insignificant and economically small.  For example, an increase of 0.1 in the HHI, say 
from a “competitive” (HHI < 0.10) to a “highly concentrated” (HHI > 0.18) market, would only 
increase the probability of Relationship Banking by around 0.3%.  We replace HHI by respectively 
(1 + Number of Branches)
-1, (1 + Number of Adjacent Branches)
-1, or (Number of Banks)
-1, but 
none of the coefficients is statistically significant or economically relevant (we chose not to 
tabulate the results). 
In Model II we add HHI
2 to capture the non-monotonicity present in for example Dinç (2000), 
Yafeh and Yosha (2001), or Anand and Galetovic (2006).  Both coefficients are statistically 
significant, though in sign opposite to the non-monotonicity predictions, and economically modest 
but relevant.  An increase in the HHI from 0.05 to 0.50 decreases the probability of observing 
                                                       
 
15 “On theoretical grounds it is difficult to justify this choice” (Greene (1997), p. 875) of a Probit model, 
hence we also rerun all exercises using a Logit model.  Given that the mean of the dependent variable is close 




relationship banking by close to 5%.  Replacing HHI and HHI
2 by a set of dummies that equal one 
if HHI is situated in a certain range (we employ 0.1 intervals) and are zero otherwise yields similar 
results.  Adding squared terms to the specifications featuring (1 + Number of Branches)
-1, (1 + 
Number of Adjacent Branches)
-1, or (Number of Banks)
-1 yield statistically insignificant and 
economically irrelevant results. 
The regressions so far left two possibly important factors determining borrower engagement 
unaccounted for.  First, banks may take into account exactly whom their competitors are in the 
postal zone given contact in other postal zones, i.e., banks may care about multi-market contact.  
Second, as argued above, proximity could encourage firms to frequent the same bank for multiple 
services during a longer time period. 
2.  Controlling for Multi-Market Contact and Distance 
To control for either pro- or anti-competitive effects arising from Multi-Market Contact, we 
introduce the contact variable in Model III in Table 4.  To control for spatial effects, we add the 
two distance measures in Model IV.  Removing Multi-Market Contact in Model IV does not alter 
the results and we center our discussion on Model IV (even though it is employing a somewhat 
smaller sample). 
The coefficients on both HHI variables remain significant and actually become substantially 
larger in Model IV.  Figure 2 displays the resulting schedule (at the means of the other variables).  
The percentage probability of observing Relationship Banking is measured along the vertical axis, 
while HHI is on the horizontal axis.  The scale on the horizontal axis is proportionate to the number 
of observations with particular values for HHI.  Increasing HHI from 0.10 to 0.18, indicated by 
vertical lines in the Figure, decreases Relationship Banking by 3.1% (from 55.0 to 51.9) while 
increasing the HHI from 0.05 to 0.50 decreases the probability by almost 10%.  We further note 
(jumping ahead somewhat in the discussion of the coefficients) that a 10% change is similar in 
magnitude to the effect of distance: a borrower located around the corner from the bank is 11.3% 
more likely to be engaged as a relationship customer than a borrower located (infinitely) far away.  
Consequently the effect of local market concentration (admittedly measured with some error) on 
relationship banking is similar to the effect of distance (probably measured more precisely) and 
hence the concentration effect should be assessed to be sizeable and economically relevant. 
These findings confirm a key result in Boot and Thakor (2000) but are at odds with Petersen and 
Rajan (1995).  Branches seemingly engage in more relationship banking when facing fiercer 
banking competition.  These findings may also be at odds with the correspondence between market 
power in banking and market power in the firms that banks lend to (Cetorelli and Strahan (2005)).  




longer and broader relationships with their banks.  Concentration in the banking sector through 
concentration in the product market would consequently be connected with more relationship 
banking.  But that is not what we find. 
However at this point it is useful to note that our findings regarding the HHI – Relationship 
Banking correspondence are qualitatively similar to the (somewhat stronger) non-monotonicity 
documented in Elsas (2005).  In his paper the incidence of the Hausbank status drops from 80% to 
40% as HHI increases from zero to 0.2, and then sharply increases to 100% for an HHI equal to 
0.45.  We conjecture that the differences in firm size and the corresponding number of bank 
engagements between his and our sample are responsible for this result.
16  The 11,222 firms in our 
“distance” sample are much smaller than the 122 firms in his sample;
17 hence our firms are possibly 
more opaque and may seek to engage fewer – sometimes one – banks to satisfy their credit needs.
18  
As a result, an increase in the number of banks on the market may result in a smaller increase in the 
degree of competition for the firms in our sample than for the large firms in Elsas (2005) that had 
engaged many (all) banks in the local market already or had engaged only large banks. 
3.  Very Concentrated Markets 
The substantial increase in Relationship Banking for HHI values close and equal to one requires 
further exploration.  Replacing HHI and HHI
2 by a set of dummies that equal one if HHI is situated 
in a certain range and are zero otherwise (to partly neutralize the effects of these observations) 
yields qualitatively similar results.  Similarly, the partial derivative on HHI equals -20.5** and -
27.3*** respectively, if we drop HHI
2 and remove observations for HHI equal to one or larger than 
0.9.  Hence the derivative remains statistically significant and economically relevant in both 
exercises. 
If Relationship Banking decreases with concentration in less concentrated markets, why then do 
we observe more relationship banking in very concentrated markets?  Physical proximity, as 
pointed out earlier, could compel a firm to frequent a close-by bank for all its needs.  A monopolist 
in a postal zone then simply satisfies this demand by providing all services, in particular when 
                                                       
 
16 The local markets in his paper are also substantially larger than in ours.  The average postal zone in Belgium 
contains less than 10,000 inhabitants, while the mean Landkreise in Germany counts around 175,000 people. 
17 The average firm in Elsas (2005) has annual sales of approximately 4,000 million BEF, while the average 
firm in our Augmented sample reports 14 million BEF in total assets. 
18 German and Belgian corporations seem to maintain a similar number of bank relationships (Ongena and 
Smith (2000b)), but small firms in general are found to have fewer bank relationships (the empirical evidence 
is reviewed in Ongena and Smith (2000a)).  The average small Belgian firm surveyed by de Bodt, et al. (2005) 
employs two banks.  The firms in the latter sample are on average more than three times larger and 7 years 




banks in other postal zones are far away.  An increase in Relationship Banking for high HHI values 
then merely affirms our a-priori choice of the postal zone as the relevant geographical market. 
Alternatively, we note that Boot and Thakor (2000) predict that a monopoly bank should engage 
in little or no Relationship Banking.  However, the monopolist bank may become an industry 
specialist at zero or low cost (by servicing all firms in the vicinity) and hence supply relationship 
banking nevertheless.  This is not modeled in Boot and Thakor, as in their model even a monopolist 
incurs specialization costs (that are not a function of market structure). 
4.  Multi-Market Contact 
Next we focus on the coefficient of Multi-Market Contact in Model IV.  Multi-Market Contact 
carries a positive sign, is statistically significant, and economically relevant.  An increase in the 
variable from 0 to 0.33 (the observed range) increases the probability of observing Relationship 
Banking by almost 10%.  However, removing both HHI variables causes the coefficient on Multi-
Market Contact to become insignificant, possibly indicating the need to control for market 
concentration and multi-market contact simultaneously. 
The contact variable is significantly and negatively correlated with HHI (see Table 3), and this 
is partly by construction.  Indeed, an increase in the number of banks in a postal zone increases the 
likelihood that some bank pairs also meet in another postal zone hereby increasing Multi-Market 
Contact.  However, an increase in the number of banks also decreases market concentration as 
measured by HHI.  We further investigate the coefficient on this variable in the robustness section.  
5.  Distance Measures 
Now we turn to the distance measures in Model IV in Table 4.  The coefficient on the 
transformed Distance to Lender is positive, statistically significant, and economically relevant, 
confirming either a multi-product or multi-period switching hypotheses emanating from spatial 
models.  The probability of observing Relationship Banking for a borrower close to the Lender 
(i.e., (1 + Distance to Lender)
-1 = 1) is more than 11% higher than for a far-away borrower (i.e., (1 
+ Distance to Lender)
-1 = 0).  On the other hand, the transformed Distance to Closest Competitor is 
not statistically significant. 
These results are unaffected if we remove either one of the two HHI and/or Multi-Market 
Contact variables.  Similarly, removing both distance variables in Model IV leaves the other 
coefficients unaffected.  Motivated by Hauswald and Marquez (2006) we further interact HHI 
and/or HHI
2 with our distance measures.  The coefficients on HHI and HHI
2 remain broadly the 
same in sign and magnitude, but are no longer significant.  The interaction terms are insignificant 
as well.  We suspect multicollinearity problems. 




bank competitor (we call these firms the “relatively close” firms) and those firms that are closer to 
the closest bank competitor than to the lender (the “relatively far” firms).  The coefficients on our 
competition measures in both subsamples retain the same sign, significance, and magnitude.  The 
distance measures are only significant for the firms that are “relatively far”. 
Taken together, these results suggest the distance variables may proxy for other factors 
(transportation costs as in Degryse and Ongena (2005)?) than those picked up by our postal zone 
and national competition measures.  By introducing branch effects we will shortly (in the 
robustness section) corroborate that Relationship Banking and Distance are seemingly not driven 
jointly by an omitted variable and that Distance (marked as a complement and not a substitute to 
Relationship Banking) may not proxy for the intensity and ease of informational flows as in 
Petersen and Rajan (2002).  Given the short distances involved these findings probably shouldn’t 
come as a surprise. 
To conclude, the observed lender engages more borrowers in relationship banking if many other 
banks (possibly with equal market shares) operate in the same postal zone or if the banks in the 
postal zone have multiple contacts across other postal zones.  More relationship banking is also 
being observed when firms are located close to the bank. 
B.  Robustness Checks 
1.  Subsample of Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships 
Model V in Table 4 focuses on the 9,213 firms that are both Single-Person Businesses (SPB) 
and Sole Proprietorships (SP).  There are a number of reasons to believe that the possible 
correspondence between competition and bank orientation will appear sharpest in this subsample.  
First, remember that we are looking at the loan portfolio of one single bank and that we now retain 
just one type of firm.  Consequentially, important firm characteristics potentially clouding our 
previous results are controlled for.  Second, Single-Person Businesses / Sole Proprietorships are the 
smallest (possibly most opaque and locally restricted) firms that are affected most by the structure 
of the local banking market. 
The findings in Model V confirm this expectation and strengthen our earlier results.  The non-
monotonicity in HHI is again economically relevant.  For example, increasing HHI from zero to 0.4 
decreases the probability of Relationship Banking by almost 15%, from 60 to 45%.  We again 
replace HHI and HHI
2 by range dummies and confirm these findings. 
2.  Additional Independent Variables and Branch Effects 
Models VI and VII in Table 4 add Age and other firm characteristics (Assets, Earnings / Assets, 




even though the samples are substantially reduced and quite different in their composition (for 
example, the Distance sample contains 83% single-person businesses, 16% small and 1% medium 
and large firms, the Age sample only 6% single-person businesses, 89% small and 5% 
medium/large, and the Augmented sample 5%, 87% and 8% respectively). 
We further add Multi-Market Contact
2 to Model III and all possible combinations of Multi-
Market Contact
2, (1 + Distance to Lender)
-2, [1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1]
2 to 
specifications IV to VII.  Admittedly we know of little theoretical justification for doing so (hence 
we choose not to tabulate the results).  However, the coefficients of HHI, HHI
2, Multi-Market 
Contact, and (1 + Distance to Lender)
-1 are virtually unaffected in significance, sign and size in all 
specifications and only the coefficient on the newly added (1 + Distance to Lender)
-2 becomes 
negative and significant at a 10% level in a few specifications. 
We further replace Branch Size by random branch effects,
19 remove Industry Dummies (to avoid 
multicollinearity problems), and employ OLS to re-estimate the main specifications.  Branch 
effects could capture omitted variables that could be correlated with bank orientation, such as 
branch service quality and local firm presence and/or competition (Cetorelli (2001)), for which we 
couldn’t construct reasonable proxies.  However, results are unaffected if anything they are even 
more “striking” in statistical significance and economic relevance. 
3.  Multi-Market Contact Deconstructed 
Multi-Market Contact between banks across postal zones stimulates Relationship Banking.  
Hence, the contact variable possibly captures a pro-competitive effect if this variable would cut in 
the same direction as HHI.  However, to shed further light on this issue we first examine more 
closely what occurs at the postal zone level (following Anand and Galetovic (2006)) and then turn 
to interacting HHI with Multi-Market Contact (as in Mester (1987) and Park and Pennacchi 
(2004)). 
Recall that in Anand and Galetovic (2006) only coordination between a few banks with equal 
market shares fosters relationship banking.  To test whether the effect of concentration on 
Relationship Banking arises through a decrease in the number of banks or through the inequality of 
bank market shares, we decompose HHI in (Number of Banks)
-1 and [HHI – (Number of Banks)
-1].  
The results (we choose not to tabulate) suggest that it is only the change in the number of banks, 
and not the change in their market shares, that is driving our results (though admittedly our measure 
based on the number of bank branches is rather coarse when measuring market shares).  An 
increase in the number of banks from for example 3 to 37 increases the probability of Relationship 
                                                       
 




Banking by 8.5% (from 40.9 to 49.4%).  Consequently the observed lender seemingly doesn’t 
coordinate with other banks at the local level in offering relationship banking (as in Anand and 
Galetovic (2006)). 
Alternatively we decompose HHI in (Branch Share of the Lender)
2 and [HHI – (Branch Share 
of the Lender)
2] to check for possible coordination between branches of the observed lender.  And 
indeed, a variety of specifications suggest that a larger relative presence of the lender increases 
Relationship Banking at about the same rate as the relative presence of other lenders decreases it, 
though the coefficients are not always statistically significant.  Taken together these results suggest 
that within one postal zone, branches of the lending bank may coordinate (independently) among 
themselves but not with the branches of the other banks present there. 
Now, given the local discretion in setting loan conditions (an assessment that is, as already 
mentioned, based on formal interviews and loan rate variation), it would be surprising if the bank 
would succeed in coordinating with other banks at the national level to achieve relationship 
orientation at the local level.  To test for the occurrence of national coordination versus a pro-
competitive effect more directly, we interact HHI and HHI
2 with Multi-Market Contact.  Mester 
(1987), for example, argues that if the Contact variable measures “mutual forbearance” then the 
Contact variable itself should have the same sign as HHI (a result we did not have so far) while the 
interaction terms should equal zero. 
Results (again unreported) are somewhat mixed.  The coefficients on the interaction terms 
suggest no coordination takes place, but multicollinearity robs the coefficients of their significance.  
The coefficient on the Multi-Market Contact variable is still positive and opposite the coefficient 
on HHI but much smaller than in earlier specifications.  To conclude, coordination may occur 
between branches of our bank, but none of the exercises suggests coordination takes place either 
locally or nationally between banks. 
4.  Alternative Definitions of the Dependent Variable 
As the duration cutoff of one year in the construction of the dependent variable Relationship 
Banking was somewhat arbitrarily chosen (remember however that results in Angelini, et al. (1998) 
and Cole (1998) suggested a short duration cutoff), we also run all specifications with a three-year 
cut-off.  Results are virtually unaffected. 
Next we employ our other two variables capturing bank orientation, i.e., Duration and Main 
Bank.  Elsas (2005), for example, argues that duration may be a poor proxy for the significance of 
the relationship; hence we employ Main Bank (by itself) as the dependent variable.  We report the 
almost unaffected results in Table 5.  We also estimate a Tobit model (censored at zero) with 




results are very similar to the ones reported above, seemingly contradicting the claim of non-
relevancy of duration as a measure of relationship importance by Elsas (2005).  We again 
conjecture that the differences in firm size and the corresponding number of bank relationships 
between his and our sample are responsible for this result.  The firms in our sample are much 
smaller and may have fewer bank relationships.  As a result, for the firms in our sample the 
observed duration of a relationship may capture or at least be correlated with relationship 
orientation. 
5.  Omitted Factors and Endogeneity 
We are further concerned that duration caused or is affected by factors that caused current 
market concentration.  For example, a pool of high-quality firms in the postal zone 10 years ago 
may have contributed to the longevity of the observed relationships as both relationships and firms 
survived (on the other hand high-quality firms may have had less need for a relationship lender).  
But circumstances in the postal zone 10 years ago that led to the high quality of the firm pool may 
also have attracted other banks to set up branches there in the period since then.  To deal with this 
pernicious problem we toss out all observations with durations exceeding 10 (7) years and rerun 
most specifications.  Even though we loose more than one third (one half) of the sample, the 
competition results are almost unaffected. 
We further collect bank branch information from the end of the year 1985,
20 recompile the HHI, 
and rerun all relevant exercises.  This newly constructed “HHI 1985” is highly correlated with the 
HHI for 1995, the correlation coefficient equals 0.92***, and therefore not surprisingly results are 
almost unaffected when the new HHI 1985 measure replaces the HHI 1995. 
C.  Control Variables 
Finally, we return to the coefficients on the control variables, starting with Branch Size.  We 
reported the coefficient on Branch Size in all Tables discussed so far.  The coefficient is almost 
always significant at a 1% level and economically quite relevant.  The partial derivative at the 
means for both Relationship Banking and Main Bank varies around -14, indicating that an increase 
from the smallest to the largest branch (0.006 to 0.905) decreases the incidence of relationship 
banking by around 13%.  The partials in the Duration Tobit models (Table 6) suggest an equivalent 
decrease by around 3 years in the length of the observed relationship for a similar increase in 
branch size.  Hence, ceteris paribus, larger bank branches pursue more transactional banking. 
                                                       
 
20 Unfortunately we could not find a comprehensive listing of branches of savings banks for 1985, but the total 
number of savings branches we know has remained constant during this time period.  Consequently we 




Berger, et al. (2005) document that larger banks have less exclusive and shorter relationships 
than smaller banks.  To make our results better comparable to theirs, we replace Branch Size by 
ln(Branch Loan Volume) defined as the natural logarithm of the loan portfolio of the branch in 
1000s of US$ (they employ the log of bank assets).  We estimate Logit and OLS models with 
Relationship Banking and ln(1 + Duration of Relationship) as the dependent variables (we don’t 
tabulate the results).  The resulting coefficients are comparable in magnitude, for duration as the 
dependent variable but not for Main Bank.  However then the definition of their scope variable, 
dummy = 1 if only lender, differs from our Main Bank variable. 
Coefficients on the other control variables are reported in Table 7.  We report the representative 
coefficients from Model IV, VI, and VII.  None of the four postal zone coefficients are consistent 
in sign, size, or statistical significance.  The legal form dummies in Model IV are highly 
significant.  Banks engage Sole Proprietorships less likely in a Relationship and profitable firms 
more likely, possibly because of bankruptcy risks.  As such the specifications highlight the need to 
control carefully for firm characteristics, as we do in Models V to VII. 
D.  Bank Industry Specialization 
1.  Dependent Variable 
Theory also provides hypotheses concerning the relation between interbank competition and 
bank industry specialization.  In Boot and Thakor (2000), for example, competition affects the 
banks’ investment in industry expertise and hence the “value” of bank-firm relationships.  In their 
model interbank competition reduces bank industry specialization in relationship loans as on the 
margin the returns to industry specialization decline.  Hence, the value added of the relationship 
loan for the borrower also decreases. 
We construct a new dependent variable measuring bank industry specialization.  We classify the 
borrowers in the 50 two-digit NACE code classes and for each branch calculate a variable Industry 
Specialization as the proportion of loans of the bank branch loan portfolio in the same industry as 
the borrower, in percentage.
21  The mean of industry specialization is 18.2% with a standard 
                                                       
 
21 Our measure assumes that the bank’s knowledge about a particular industry flows from observing the loan 
repayments by other bank borrowers active in that industry.  However, in Boot and Thakor (2000) the degree 
of industry specialization is chosen ex-ante and is not derived from the actual composition of the realized loan 
portfolio.  In addition, the degree of industry specialization is observable in their model by the individual 
borrower upon their first contact with the bank.  We doubt the bank branches we study ever recorded their “ex 
ante” choices and costs of industry specialization, but we consider these costs unlikely to be observable by the 
borrowers in any case.  In that sense our ex post measure relying on portfolio composition may be a reasonable 
proxy for the branch’s selected degree of specialization as the bank’s clientele in an industry may have been 




deviation of 13.9%.  The cost of industry specialization is bank-specific in Boot and Thakor (2000) 
and further depends on the diversity of borrower types served by the bank.  Consequently when 
estimating the impact of competition on industry specialization we again control for branch 
characteristics such as branch size.
22 
2.  Estimation Results 
We now analyze the regressions of the dependent variable(s) measuring bank industry 
specialization on the same set of competition and control variables.  We first employ ordinary least 
squares.  The dependent variable, Industry Specialization, is by construction always larger than 
zero, but it is censored at 100.  However, as the variable is equal to 100 for only 19 borrowers we 
disregard this minor censoring issue.  We follow the same line-up of exercises as for bank 
orientation and report the results in Table 8.  Overall our results indicate that market concentration 
is hardly economically relevant in explaining industry specialization and that any reported 
statistical relationship is weak and seemingly not robust to model alterations. 
We start by focusing on the full sample.  In Model I in Table 8, we introduce HHI as the 
measure for concentration.  The coefficient turns out to be both statistically and economically 
insignificant.  Theory suggests potential non-monotonicity; hence, we incorporate HHI
2 in Model 
II.  The results remain insignificant providing no evidence in favor of banks specializing in an 
industry when competition is high (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004)) or intermediate (Boot and 
Thakor (2000)).  Model III in Table 8 incorporates the Multi-Market Contact variable.  If more 
contact implies a pro-competitive effect, Boot and Thakor (2000) hypothesize less industry 
specialization should be observed, whereas according to Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) more 
industry specialization should be observed.  Our empirical results are in line with the former 
suggesting that more competition leads to less specialization.  But the effects seem rather modest.  
For example, an increase in the contact variable from 0 to 0.33 (minimum to maximum) decreases 
Industry Specialization by around 3%. 
                                                       
 
22 The bank chooses first the degree of industry specialization followed by its orientation in Boot and Thakor 
(2000).  Its specialization decision is conditioned on the assessed probability distribution over borrower 
quality, while the orientation decision is made on the basis of the actual (representative) borrower’s quality.  
For any outside observer (uninformed about the bank’s initial assessment and decision) the two decisions 
appear inseparable and estimating two reduced-form equations containing orientation and specialization 
respectively (as dependent variables) seems appropriate.  The borrower can decide to go to either the capital 
market or the banking market in between the bank’s industry specialization and orientation decision.  The 
corresponding selection issue appears minimal for most firms in our sample that have no access to the capital 
market anyway.  The first-round matching with the banks is stochastic (borrowers also don’t know the degree 
of bank specialization in the model) and is followed by the orientation decision and random competitive 




We again arrive at our Base Model (IV) by incorporating the two distance measures.  Our 
transformed Distance to Lender is again statistically significant, but only at a 10% level, and 
negative.  The closer the borrower the less specialization we observe.  But the effects also seem 
modest.  Industry Specialization for a close borrower is only 1.4% lower than for a borrower far 
away.  The transformed Distance to Closest Competitors is not significant. 
The Base Model also suggests a concave relationship between HHI and specialization, but the 
coefficients are seemingly small.  Figure 3 plots the resulting schedule (at the means of the other 
variables) using a similar setup as in Figure 2.  An increase in HHI from 0.10 to 0.18 (the vertical 
lines marking the regions with varying degree of competition), for example, increases industry 
specialization by only 0.4% (from 17.8 to 18.2%).  Figure 3 broadly confirms that competition 
reduces industry specialization at the branch level, but also suggests small economic relevance. 
To conclude, the branches of the analyzed bank engage somewhat fewer borrowers in the same 
industry if local market concentration decreases or when banks in the postal zone have more 
contacts across other postal zones.  Branches possibly reduce industry specialization as competition 
intensifies.  But the effects seem at best rather modest, both in terms of statistical significance and 
economic relevance.  Less industry specialization is also being observed when firms are located 
closer to the bank.  In that case, industry specialization may become less prevalent because 
borrowers are less discriminate about their choice of bank branch. 
3.  Robustness Checks and Control Variables 
In Model V in Table 8 we again restrict the sample to the 9,213 firms that are both Single-
Person Businesses (SPB) and Sole Proprietorships (SP).  However, we continue to assume that 
Industry Specialization is based on the entire loan portfolio of the branch.  As expected (as these 
firms are possibly more opaque), results are statistically somewhat more significant and 
economically relevant.  Next we add Age in Model VI and other Firm Characteristics in Model VII.  
Now all coefficients on the Competition variables become insignificant confirming our earlier 
assessments of relatively weak statistical significance. 
In Boot and Thakor (2000) competition affects bank industry specialization only for 
relationship borrowers.  We run all models on the set of borrowers we identified as relationship 
borrowers, (i.e., Relationship Banking = 1).  We first assume that industry specialization should be 
measured only for the portfolio containing these relationship borrowers.  We rerun all 
specifications but choose not to report.  Most coefficients are similar in sign and size, but 
somewhat less statistically significant.  Next we measure industry specialization for the entire loan 
portfolio of the branch (assuming some positive knowledge spillovers from transactional lending) 




unaffected and again we choose not to tabulate them. 
Next we are concerned about overweighing industry specialization by large branches (by 
definition many borrowers belong to those industries that large branches specialize in).  We weigh 
all observations by the inverse of the number in each industry – branch group.  None of the 
coefficients on the competition variables are statistically significant or economically relevant any 
longer indicating that only large branches adjust their degree of specialization in their focused 
industries somewhat to competition.  This interpretation may also explain the percentage-wise 
small adjustments we pick up. 
Our “linear” industry specialization measure may further fail to accommodate for the possible 
presence of fixed specialization costs and/or learning.  We take the natural log of Industry 
Specialization and rerun all OLS and WLS exercises.  Results are qualitatively unaffected. 
Finally, we discuss the control variables.  The coefficient on Branch Size is always negative, 
significant, and economically relevant in Table 8.  Increasing Branch Size from the smallest to the 
largest branch decreases Industry Specialization by around 6.5% to 12.5%.  The other control 
variables are hardly statistically significant (and left unreported). 
V. Conclusion 
Are competition and relationships necessarily inimical?  We address this issue employing a 
unique data set containing detailed information on both bank-firm relationships and the local 
banking market structure.  Interbank competition seemingly affects bank orientation (and to a much 
lesser extent bank industry specialization).  Fiercer competition results in more relationship 
banking (in most observed cases).  Borrowers located closer to the bank branch are more likely to 
consume other bank services and to be engaged over a longer time period.  Finally, larger bank 
branches lend substantially more on a transactional basis but are less likely to be specialized in 
particular industries.  We cannot fail to notice that bank entry in a spatial model of competition 
decreases market concentration, bank – borrower distance, and bank branch size, and that the 
estimated coefficients on all three variables are negative, significant, and of almost equal economic 
relevancy. 
Taken at face value these results cannot reject hypotheses proposed by Boot and Thakor (2000), 
among others, suggesting competition and relationships are not necessarily inimical.  However the 
results seem at odds with insights and results by for example Petersen and Rajan (1995).  
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TABLE 1.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
# Obs is the number of observations.  
a The definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main bank is: for Single-Person Businesses and Small Firms, have a 
“turnover” on the current account of at least BEF 100,000 per month and buy at least two products from that bank.  
b We set HHI = 1 and (Number of Banks)
-1 = 1 if the 
Number of Branches = 0.  
c 40 Belgian Francs (BEF) are approximately equal to 1 Euro.  
d The dummies for Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships are 
suppressed in the regressions, hence not included in the Table. 
Variables  Definition  # Obs  Mean  St.dev   Min  Max 
              Dependent Variables             
Relationship Banking  = 1 if the length of the relationship with the borrower exceeds one year 
and if the bank considers itself as main bank
a 
13,098  0.524  0.499  0  1 
Duration of Relationship  Length of relationship with current lender, in years  13,098  7.8  5.5  0  26.3 
Main Bank  = 1 if bank considers itself as main bank
a 
  13,098  54.3  49.8  0  1 
  ln(1 + Duration of Relationship)  13,098  1.9  0.8  0.0  3.3 
             
Competition Variables             
Number of Branches  Number of bank branches in borrower’s postal zone  13,098  16.4  15.6  0  103 
Number of Adjacent Branches  Number of bank branches in borrower’s and adjacent postal zones  13,098  70.9  47.1  0  471 
Number of Banks  Number of banks in borrower’s postal zone  13,098  8.3  4.8  0  37 
HHI  Herfindahl – Hirschman Index, i.e. the summed squares of bank 
market shares by number of branches in borrower’s postal zone
 
13,098  0.205  0.194  0.057  1
b 
Multi-Market Contact  Sum of the bank pairs in borrower’s postal zone weighted by the 
relative frequency of their bilateral contacts in other postal zones (see 
Appendix). 
13,098  0.174  0.080  0  0.335 
  (1 + Number of Branches)
-1  13,098  0.123  0.178  0.009  1 
  (1 + Number of Adjacent Branches)
-1  13,098  0.047  0.175  0.001  1 
  (Number of Banks)
-1  13,098  0.183  0.199  0.027  1
b 
  HHI
2  13,098  0.079  0.214  0.003  1 
  HHI – (Number of Banks)
-1  13,098  0.021  0.023  0  0.875 
  (Number of Banks)
-2  13,098  0.073  0.214  0.000  1
b 
  [ HHI – (Number of Banks)
-1  ]
2  13,098  0.001  0.010  0  0.765 
  (Number of Banks)
-1 [ HHI – (Number of Banks)
-1  ]  13,098  0.002  0.004  0  0.140 





Distance Variables             
Distance to Lender  Shortest traveling time, in minutes  11,222  6.7  7.2  0  51 
Distance to Closest 
Competitors 
Shortest traveling time to closest quartile competitor in borrower’s 
postal zone, in minutes 
11,222  3.7  2.3  0  24 
  (1 + Distance to Lender)
-1  11,222  0.223  0.151  0.019  1 
  1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1  11,222  0.734  0.148  0  0.960 
             
Bank Branch Characteristic             
Branch Size  Proportion of bank loan portfolio at the bank branch, in percent   13,098  0.249  0.152  0.006  0.905 
             
Postal Zone Variables  Including 8 Postal Area Dummies           
Number of Firms  Number of registered firms in the borrower’s postal zone, in thousands  13,098  0.749  0.891  0.002  6.103 
Assets of Firms  Average amount of assets of registered firms in the borrower’s postal 
zone, in billions of BEF
c 
13,098  0.068  0.131  0.000  3.739 
Industry Concentration  Proportion of registered firms in borrower’s postal zone in industry of 
borrower, in percent  
13,098  1.9  3.4  0  66.6 
Urban  = 1 if located in agglomeration > 250,000 inhabitants  13,098  0.099  0.298  0  1 
             
Firm Dummies
d  Including 49 Industry Dummies           
Small Firm  = 1 if < 10 employees and turnover < 250 million BEF
c  13,098  0.160  0.367  0  1 
Medium and Large Firm  = 1 if > 10 employees or turnover > 250 million BEF
c  13,098  0.012  0.111  0  1 
Limited Partnership  = 1 if firm is limited partnership  13,098  0.121  0.326  0  1 
Limited Partnership w/ ES  = 1 if firm is limited partnership with equal sharing  13,098  0.010  0.103  0  1 
Corporation  = 1 if firm is corporation  13,098  0.039  0.194  0  1 
Temporary Arrangement  = 1 if firm is a temporary arrangement  13,098  0.009  0.095  0  1 
             
Firm Characteristics             
Age  in years  1,991  16.4  24.3  0  96.2 
Assets
  in billions of BEF
c  645  0.014  0.049  0.000  0.878 
Earnings / Assets
  in percent   645  0.117  0.148  -0.528  1.252 
Short-Term Debt / Assets
  in percent   645  0.406  0.216  0.001  0.957 
             TABLE 2.  SAMPLES’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Sample  All  Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
           
Number of Observations  13,098  11,222  9,213  1,991  645 
Number of Postal Zones  922  737  717  509  309 
           
Average Relationship Banking, in %  52.4  53.0  51.4  60.5  65.7 
           
 
 
TABLE 3.  CORRELATION TABLE 
The number of observations is 13,098 in the area (1) – (6) and 11,222 elsewhere.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, using Pearson-correlation. 
    (2)  (3)  (4)  (4)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
Relationship Banking  (1)  0.963***  0.361***  -0.010  -0.003  0.003  0.034***  0.008 
ln(Duration of Relationship)  (2)  1  0.291***  -0.030***  -0.023***  0.028***  0.098***  0.014 
Main Bank  (3)    1  -0.007  -0.001  0.003  0.027***  0.009 
HHI  (4)      1  0.980***  -0.286***  -0.180***  -0.046*** 
HHI
2  (5)        1  -0.420***  -0.149***  -0.017* 
Multi-Market Contact  (6)          1  -0.045***  -0.153*** 
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1  (7)            1  -0.281*** 
1–(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1  (8)              1 
                 TABLE 4.  BANK ORIENTATION 
The dependent variable is Relationship Banking.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the partial derivatives at the means, in percent, 
from binary Probit models.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships.  The Pseudo 
R
 squared is calculated as in Zavoina and McElvey (1975). 
Model  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
                Sample  All  All  All  Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  13,098  13,098  13,098  11,222  9,213  1,991  645 
               
               
HHI  3.1  -23.1*  -44.8***  -56.0***  -64.3***  -52.8  -118.1* 
HHI
2    23.8**  46.0***  64.1***  67.4***  72.2*  158.7** 
Multi-Market Contact      17.5*  28.0***  26.4**  47.4**  112.8*** 
               
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1        11.3***  12.6***  11.9  33.0** 
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1        3.8  2.6  12.1  8.3 
Branch Size  -14.3***  -14.9***  -14.3***  -13.7***  -11.7***  -27.7***  -11.4 
               
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #  #  #  #  #  #  # 
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #  #  #  #       
Industry Dummies  #  #  #  #  #     
Age            #   
Firm Characteristics              # 
               
Pseudo R
 squared  0.406  0.406  0.406  0.406  0.404  0.392  0.404 
               TABLE 5.  BANK ORIENTATION: MAIN BANK 
The dependent variable is Main Bank.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the partial derivatives at the means, in percent, from 
binary Probit models.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships.  The Pseudo R
 
squared is calculated as in Zavoina and McElvey (1975). 
Model  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
                Sample  All  All  All  Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  13,098  13,098  13,098  11,222  9,213  1,991  645 
               
               
HHI  4.0  -18.9  -45.5***  -58.4***  -65.0***  -66.4*  -134.4** 
HHI
2    20.9*  48.1***  68.6***  70.0***  86.6**  170.4*** 
Multi-Market Contact      21.4**  34.0***  30.1***  58.8***  114.1*** 
               
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1        9.6***  10.3***  12.5  32.0** 
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1        3.9  2.9  10.4  8.6 
Branch Size  -13.8***  -14.3***  -13.6***  -14.2***  -11.7***  -29.2***  -7.9 
               
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #  #  #  #  #  #  # 
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #  #  #  #       
Industry Dummies  #  #  #  #  #     
Age            #   
Firm Characteristics              # 
               
Pseudo R
 squared
  0.408  0.408  0.408  0.409  0.403  0.386  0.400 
               TABLE 6.  BANK ORIENTATION: DURATION OF RELATIONSHIP 
The dependent variable is ln(Duration of Relationship).  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the partial derivatives at the means from 
Tobit models.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships. 
Model  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
                Sample  All  All  All  Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  13,098  13,098  13,098  11,222  9,213  1,991  645 
               
               
HHI  -0.0  -0.6***  -1.2***  -1.0***  -1.2***  -0.6  -1.6* 
HHI
2    0.6***  1.1***  0.9***  1.1***  0.7  1.9** 
Multi-Market Contact      0.4***  0.6***  0.7***  0.7**  1.6*** 
               
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1        0.4***  0.4***  0.5***  0.9*** 
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1        0.1***  1.7***  0.2*  0.2 
Branch Size  -0.4***  -0.4***  -0.4***  -0.3***  -0.4***  -0.1  -0.1 
               
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #  #  #  #  #  #  # 
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #  #  #  #       
Industry Dummies  #  #  #  #  #     
Age            #   
Firm Characteristics              # 
               
Adjusted R squared (of equivalent OLS)  0.101  0.102  0.103  0.105  0.041  0.051  0.050 
               TABLE 7.  CONTROL VARIABLES 
The dependent variable is Relationship Banking.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  
The table reports the partial derivatives at the means, in percent, from binary Probit models (RB), or the 
coefficients from ordinary least squares models (IS).  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships. 
Model  IV  VI  VII 
Sample  Distance  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  11,222  1,991  645 
       
Competition Variables  #  #  # 
Bank Branch Characteristic  #  #  # 
Postal Area Dummies and Constant  #  #  # 
Industry Dummies  #     
       
Number of Firms  1.1  -0.0  5.7** 
Industry Concentration  -32.7  80.6**  -12.3 
Assets of Firms  -3.0  -8.2  6.0 
Urban  1.1  10.0**  26.6 
Small Firm  -8.0     
Medium and Large Firm  -7.0     
Limited Partnership  16.1***     
Limited Partnership w/ ES  23.0***     
Corporation  17.2***     
Temporary Arrangement  12.5*     
Age    -0.0  -0.1* 
Assets      -27.8 
Earnings / Assets      31.2** 
Short-Term Debt / Assets      -12.9 
       TABLE 8.  BANK INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION 
The dependent variable is Industry Specialization.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 1.  The table reports the coefficients from ordinary least squares 
models.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  SPB & SP: Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships. 
Model  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
                Sample  All  All  All  Distance  SPB & SP  Age  Augmented 
Number of Observations  13,098  13,098  13,098  11,222  9,213  1,991  645 
               
               
HHI  0.2  -1.6  7.4**  7.3*  9.4**  5.0  -0.5 
HHI
2    1.7  -7.5**  -6.4  -8.1*  -0.8  3.8 
Multi-Market Contact      -9.0***  -5.0**  -6.4**  2.2  7.0 
               
(1+Distance to Lender)
-1        -1.4*  -1.5*  -1.6  -4.9 
1 – (1 + Distance to Closest Competitors)
-1        1.1  1.1  1.2  -0.0 
Branch Size  -8.7***  -8.7***  -14.0***  -8.1***  -7.2***  -10.3***  -10.5*** 
               
Postal Zone Variables and Constant  #  #  #  #  #  #  # 
Firm Size and Legal Form Dummies
  #  #  #  #       
Industry Dummies  #  #  #  #  #     
Age            #   
Firm Characteristics              # 
               
Adjusted R squared  0.385  0.385  0.385  0.397  0.386  0.026  0.038 
               
 